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Abstract 
 
We conduct computational experiment using Facebook data to evaluate competing firms’ initial 
market seeding and subsequent targeted marketing strategies that influence consumers’ new 
product adoption decisions. We find that firms generally overspend their advertising budget in the 
market seeding phase. In the subsequent market advertising phase, a coupon strategy (equivalent 
to price discount) generally yields higher market share than the strategy of distributing free 
product samples. The effect is more significant when both price and product quality are low. We 
offer managerial insights into firms’ effective competition strategies for new product introduction 
in the presence of consumers’ word of mouth effects in social networks. 
  
Keywords: Computational Experiment, Price Competition, Word of Mouth, Targeted Marketing, 
Social Network 
 
1. Introduction 
Advanced information technologies such as smart phones and mobile apps have led to increasing 
connectivity of consumers through their social media interactions. This paradigm shift has resulted 
in changing patterns of product evaluation and purchase decisions. When firms introduce new 
products, they must consider how the word of mouth (WOM) effects among consumers influence 
the efficacy of product pricing and marketing strategies. In this research, we examine consumers’ 
new product adoption behavior in a social network and study firms’ retail competition under the 
WOM influence and network effects. 
Specifically, we consider two competing firms that sell substitutable new products in a social 
network. Consumers have heterogeneous valuation of the product, which depends on both the 
product quality and a positive network effect. The product quality is unobservable to a consumer, 
but the consumer can infer it from the WOM influence through her social interactions with other 
consumers. The two firms make decisions about product quality, price, initial seeding and 
subsequent targeted marketing strategies for selling the new product. We investigate two targeted 
marketing strategies: a coupon strategy that offers price discount for a full product purchase 
without revealing the true product quality, and a sample strategy that reveals the true product 
quality by offering free product samples without giving price discount for the full product purchase. 
Because of the inherent dynamics and uncertainty in consumer product evaluation, the 
structural influence of the social network, and the firm’s initial seeding and subsequent marketing 
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strategies on the propagation of WOM information, it is impossible to perform traditional 
equilibrium analysis. We therefore conduct computational experiment to evaluate the market 
equilibrium outcome. We find prisoner’s dilemma exists in social media marketing under retail 
competition—because of competitive concerns, firms generally overspend on initial market 
seeding and advertising. In fact, both firms would be better off were they advertise less 
aggressively. Our results show that coupon strategy generally yields higher market share than the 
sample strategy. The effect is more significant when both price and product quality are low. We 
offer new insights into firms’ marketing strategies for new product introduction in the presence of 
both WOM influence and social network effects. 
  
2. Related Literature 
Research on consumer behavior shows that consumers’ product evaluation and purchase decisions 
are influenced by their reference groups (Bearden and Etzel, 1982). For example, Chen and Xie 
(2008) study how firms should manage and strategically influence the consumers’ online WOM 
interactions. Aral et al. (2011) and Dou et al. (2013) show that firms can strategically engineer the 
strength of network effects via social media. 
In addition, prior research shows that initial seeding of the network plays a significant role in 
maximizing the spread of influence. How the firm maximizes its product sales by strategically 
influencing the WOM diffusion in a given network through a targeted set of individuals is termed 
as the influence maximization problem (Kempe et al. 2003). Consumers’ new product adoption 
behavior in a social network can be modeled as cascading processes, where actions chosen by 
nodes (consumers) influence the subsequent behavior of neighbors in the network graph 
(Chierichetti et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2014). We complement this line of research by considering 
firms’ competition in a social network.   
 
3. Problem Formulation  
3.1 Sequence of the Game 
In this section, we describe the firms’ strategies and consumers’ decision making. 
 
Figure 1. Sequence of the Game 
Figure 1 depicts the sequence of the game. Consider two firms developing competing new 
products. In the product planning period, the two firms choose to produce either a high quality (𝑞𝐻) 
or low quality (𝑞𝐿) product. They engage in price competition. Let 𝑝𝑗, where 𝑗 = 1,2, be the price 
firm 𝑗 charges. We assume the product price information is common knowledge.  
When introducing the new product to market, each firm makes two strategic decisions to target 
consumers and influence consumers’ subsequent adoption behavior: 1) the initial seeding phase 
that triggers the first time purchase of a new product and brings product awareness to these early 
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adopters; 2) the subsequent targeted marketing phase that aims to reach additional prospective 
consumers and to convert them to final purchasers, considering the WOM influence from early 
adopters in the social network. We assume each firm has a fixed budget. We allow each firm to 
allocate its budget between the two phases. In our computational experiment, the initial seeding is 
implemented in round 0 and the targeted marketing is implemented from round 1 onwards till 
convergence to the market equilibrium. 
Consumers who are aware of a product make product adoption decisions. Upon adoption, there 
is a lock-in period 𝜏 in which the consumer cannot switch to the other firm’s product. Rational 
consumers may switch to the other firm’s product if she is unlocked and if her overall utility 
derived from alternative product is higher than the adopted product. Because the consumer’s 
product valuation depends on both the perceived product quality and the network value, both can 
be influenced by the consumer’s network neighbors, switching is definitely possible. The final 
market equilibrium is achieved when no consumers have incentive to change their adoption 
decisions. 
 
3.2 Firms’ Decision Making 
The firm’s decision making includes two phases. The first is the initial seeding phase. The two 
firms simultaneously make the initial seeding decisions to bring consumer awareness. Each firm 
decides the proportion of population to reach in round 0, expressed as 𝑥𝑗%. We assume convex 
cost of advertising, which implies that advertising cost increases at an increasing rate when firms 
attempt to reach more consumers.  
The second phase is the targeted marketing phase. Starting from round 1, each firm has 
opportunities to reach more consumers in each subsequent round with the remaining marketing 
budget until the budget runs out. In this phase, firms preferentially reach potential customers based 
on their centrality measures in the social network (i.e., either highest degrees to maximize reach 
or lowest degrees to minimize competition). There are two strategies to choose from: sample 
strategy and coupon strategy. The two strategies have different cost implications to the firms. 
When the firm gives out free samples to the consumers, firm incurs a fixed investment cost 𝑏 per 
consumer, regardless of whether the consumer adopts the product or not. When the firm uses the 
coupon strategy, the investment cost only occurs when a potential consumer is converted to a real 
adopter of the firm’s product, as the price reduction only takes effect when being redeemed. 
The two strategies also have different product quality implications to consumers. Because 
consumers who receive the sample can physically evaluate the product quality, we assume they 
observe the true product quality under the sample strategy. This is different from the coupon 
strategy, in which the coupon works just as a price discount upon redemption. The true quality of 
the product cannot be directly observed. 
 
3.3 Consumer’s Decision Making 
We define firm 𝑗’s informed consumer as a consumer who is aware of firm 𝑗’s product because 
either at least one of the consumer’s neighbors has already adopted firm 𝑗’s product, or firm 𝑗 
contacts the consumer directly via the firm’s marketing effort. Other consumers are uninformed 
by firm 𝑗 and are unaware of firm 𝑗’s product. 
In each round, all informed consumers make simultaneous adoption decisions based on their 
evaluation of utilities. We assume a consumer’s utility has both an individual effect and a local 
network effect. The individual effect refers to a consumer’s intrinsic valuation (genuine interest) 
in obtaining the product. Following a standard vertical product differentiation model, we assume 
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consumer valuation for high quality product is 𝑣, and that for low quality product is 𝛿𝑣. Here the 
parameter 0 < 𝛿 < 1 is the discount factor.  
The local network effect refers to the increased consumption utility a consumer derives when a 
large number of immediate neighbors have adopted the product. Consider a social network with 
𝑁 nodes. Denote 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 as the number of consumer 𝑖’s neighbors who have already adopted firm 
𝑗’s product at time 𝑡. This information is observable. Let 𝑘 measure the strength of the positive 
network externality. The term 𝑘
𝑛𝑖𝑗
𝑁
, 𝑗 = 1,2, captures the benefit to each consumer from having 
𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡  neighbors adopting firm 𝑗’s product at time 𝑡 . Therefore, an informed consumer 𝑖  who 
observes firm 𝑗’s product quality 𝑞 and has 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡  neighbors who have already adopted firm 𝑗’s 
product will derive the following utility at time 𝑡: 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑞 = 𝑣𝑖
𝑞 − 𝑝𝑗 + 𝑘
𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑁
 (1) 
where 
 𝑣𝑖
𝑞 = {
𝑣𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 = 𝑞𝐻
𝛿𝑣𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 = 𝑞𝐿
 (2) 
We denote firm 𝑗’s uninformed consumer’s utility 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑞 = 0 and assume the reservation utility 
is 𝑠. In the initial seeding phase, if a consumer is only reached by firm 𝑗, then the consumer adopts 
the firm’s product if 𝑈𝑖𝑗0
𝑞 ≥ 𝑠. If a consumer is reached by both firms, then the consumer adopts 
firm 𝑗’s product if the utility she derives from adopting firm 𝑗’s product not only is greater than 
her reservation utility but also gives her higher utility than that from adopting the other firm’s 
product. In case there is a tie, the consumer randomly picks one firm’s product to adopt. For 
notation convenience, we use 𝑗 ̅ to denote the other firm (not firm 𝑗). The consumer adopts firm 
𝑗’s product if  𝑈𝑖𝑗0
𝑞  > max[𝑈𝑖?̅?0
𝑞  , 𝑠]. Once a consumer has adopted a product, the consumer has a 
lock-in period of 𝜏 rounds. No change of adoption can be allowed within the lock-in periods, thus 
no decision is necessary for the locked-in consumers. After the elapse of the lock-in periods, the 
consumer can reevaluate her choice and can change her adoption decision.  
We assume initially product quality is unobservable. There are two cases that consumers know 
the true product quality. The first case is when consumers adopt the product. The second case is 
when the firm uses sample strategy, where consumers who get the firm’s sample know the true 
product quality. The product quality is unobservable to other consumers. They use Bayes’ rule to 
update their belief about the two firms’ product quality based on the signals shared by their network 
neighbors who have already adopted the products. Assume the prior belief that a product is of high 
quality is 𝑃(𝑞𝐻) = 𝑝. A consumer who has adopted a firm’s product shares the product quality 
information with his/her directly connected friends. We assume the WOM signal of the product 
takes two values: good or bad. Moreover, an earlier adopter is more likely to share good (denote 
as G) or bad (denote as B) WOM signals when the true quality of the product is high or low, 
respectively. So 𝑃(𝐺|𝑞𝐻) = 𝑃(𝐵|𝑞𝐿) = 𝜆 >
1
2
. For a focal node, assume 𝑁𝑖  neighbours have 
adopted firm 𝑖’s product, among whom  𝛼𝑖 neighbours have shared good signals and 𝛽𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖 −
𝛼𝑖  neighbours have shared bad signals. The posterior quality is expressed as 𝐸(𝑞|𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) =
𝑃(𝑞𝐻|𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖)𝑣𝑖
𝑞𝐻 + 𝑃(𝑞𝐿|𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖)𝑣𝑖
𝑞𝐿. In the case of unobservable product quality, 𝑣𝑖
𝑞
 in Equation 
(1) is replaced by 𝐸(𝑞|𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) and is interpreted as perceived product quality. 
 
4. Experiment 
We take the real Facebook network as our experimental testbed. The anonymized Facebook dataset 
is obtained from Stanford Network Analysis Project, which contains 4,039 nodes and 88,234 
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friendship links, constituting a scale-free network that follows power-law distribution. Given this 
network structure, we initialize each node with a product valuation randomly drawn from a 
uniform distribution [0,1]. We set up our controlled experiment as follows. 
Parameter Description 
Price 𝑝 ∈ {𝑙𝑜𝑤, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ}, low or high price of the product 
Quality 𝑞 ∈ {𝑙𝑜𝑤, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ}, low or high quality of the product  
Marketing Strategies 𝑚 ∈ {𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒, 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛}, product sample and price discount 
Initial Seeding 𝑠 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}, a high or low percentage of the population to 
reach in round 0  
Targeting Method 𝑡 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}, preferentially reach the highest or the lowest 
degree consumers  
Table 1. Experiment Design 
We have four price-quality pairs: {low-low, low-high, high-low, high-high}. For each pair, we 
compare two marketing strategies: the sample strategy and the coupon strategy. Under each 
strategy, there are 2 × 2 initial seeding and subsequent targeted marketing strategies: {HH, HL, 
LH, LL}. For example, HH indicates that a high proportion of population is being seeded in the 
seeding phase and the highest degree nodes being selected first in reaching out to consumers. Other 
strategies can be understood in a similar way.  
In each round of iteration, both firms take efforts to reach potential consumers and consumers 
make subsequent purchase decisions. The market converges after many iterations when both firms 
run out of marketing budget and when no consumers have incentive to switch their adoption 
decisions. Upon convergence, market equilibrium emerges. For each experiment, we generate 10 
instances of the heterogeneous valuation in the Facebook network. We compute the average 
equilibrium market share of both firms as the final performance measure of the market outcome, 
which we use to construct the payoff matrix under different strategy pairs. Then the equilibrium 
outcome can be analyzed as the usual normal form game. Multiple equilibria or no equilibrium is 
possible. Table 2 shows our equilibrium initial seeding and targeted marketing strategies under the 
non-cooperative game and cooperative game, respectively.  
Price Quality Equilibrium Outcome  Sample Strategy Coupon Strategy 
low low Non-cooperative  HH (30.4%) HH (40.1%) 
  Cooperative LL (35.6%)* LH/LL(40.2%) 
 high Non-cooperative  HH (38.4%) HH (40.1%) 
  Cooperative LL (41.8%)* LH/LL(40.2%) 
high low Non-cooperative  LL (13.3%) No pure strategy equilibrium 
  Cooperative LL (13.3%) LL/LH/HL/ HH (26.9%) 
 high Non-cooperative  LH (29.7%) HH (26.9%) 
  Cooperative LL (29.7%) LL/LH/HL/ HH (26.9%) 
Note: * indicates the difference of equilibrium market shares between the non-cooperative strategy and cooperative 
strategy is statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
Table 2. Equilibrium Market Share under the Sample and Coupon Strategies 
The non-cooperative game outcome is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium based on the payoff 
matrix constructed for the normal form game. The cooperative equilibrium outcome refers to the 
market outcome when both firms can cooperate to generate the highest mutual benefits. 
Interestingly, we find prisoner’s dilemma type of game outcome. For example, when both the 
product price and quality are low, under the sample strategy, if both firms play non-cooperatively, 
the pure strategy equilibrium is HH, in which both firms seed a high proportion of population in 
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the seeding phase and target the highest degree nodes to reach out remaining potential consumers 
in subsequent marketing phase. Finally both firms achieve 30.4% market share, respectively, 
which is lower than 35.6% if they can coordinate and both choose LL strategy (which suggests a 
lower percentage of budget in the seeding phase, and target at the lowest degree consumers). The 
reason that HH strategy is suboptimal is as follows. In the initial seeding phase, firms have spent 
higher than necessary budget to seed the market, being fear of the rival firm would gain early 
mover advantage. Because both firms try to reach the highest degree nodes, they are likely to 
advertise to the same highly connected consumers. Because each consumer only adopts one 
product, some of the advertising budget will be waste in the competition. Both firms would be 
better off if they target the lowest degree nodes to avoid head-to-head competition, and if they save 
their budget to later targeted marketing rather than initial advertising. 
Overall, we find the firm’s non-cooperative strategy yields lower market share than the 
cooperative strategy. In the non-cooperative game, the coupon strategy yields higher market share 
than the sample strategy, especially when both the product price and quality are low. The market 
share difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level when the product price is low under the 
sample strategy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As social media marketing gains the momentum and the retail competition becomes more intense, 
firms seek the most effective marketing strategies to influence consumers’ product adoption 
decisions in the social network. We employ an experimental approach to study product awareness 
building, influence propagation and final product adoption by considering various marketing 
strategies, such as coupon redemption and product samples to compete for market share. Based on 
computational experiment, we determine the market equilibrium and analyze the corresponding 
market outcomes. 
In this research, we focus on symmetric game. Future work may look at the asymmetric game. 
For example, firms may choose different product price and quality levels. In the current analysis, 
we randomly generate the intrinsic utility among network users. Future research may allow 
correlation in product valuation. We conjecture some types of niche-seeking strategy of the firms 
might emerge. 
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